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use#LAATHE EMERGING ROLE OF ETHICS ADVISORS, 
GENERAL COUNSEL, AND OTHER 
COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS IN LARGE LAW 
FIRMS 
Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly are turning 
to in-house ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and other specialists to manage 
the firm’s compliance with professional regulation.
1 According to one account, 
“most large law firms have their own in-house ethics gurus, people who are 
expected to set policy and provide ethics advice on internal matters, malpractice 
claims and similar issues.”
2 Moreover, in the past ten years, a number of firms 
have created formal management positions such as “risk manager” and “general 
counsel.”
3 Robert A. Creamer, Vice President and Loss Prevention Counsel for the 
Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), a mutual insurance company 
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    1.  See Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor, Practical Benefits for 
the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL  ETHICS 1011, 1028–29 (1994); David Hricik, 
Uncertainty, Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 REV. 
LITIG. 706 (1997); Peter R. Jarvis, Ethics Advisors Watch Over Firms, NAT’L L. J., July 13, 
1992, at 15; Daniel Kennedy, New Trend is General Counsel in Firms, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, 
at 29; Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like 
Their Clients, to Look Inside for Advice, NAT’L L. J., July 18, 1994, at A1.  
    2.  Hricik, supra note 1, at 706. 
    3.  See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 29 (discussing the creation of a general 
counsel position at Winston & Strawn); Taylor, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing the creation 
of general counsel positions at Arter & Hadden of Cleveland, Gardere & Wynne LLP of 
Dallas, and Munsch, Hardt, Kopf, Harr & Dinan of Dallas).  560  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 44:559 
 
 
owned by large law firms,
4 reports that there are over 875 “loss prevention 
partners” in ALAS member firms alone.
5  
Most commentators attribute firms’ increasing reliance on in-house 
compliance specialists to the increasing complexity of professional regulation
6 and 
the increasing number of claims against lawyers.
7 “It’s a dangerous world that 
large law firms are in now,” says one managing partner. “We are attractive 
defendants.”
8 In addition to managing claims and potential claims against the firm, 
proponents argue that in-house specialists may play an important preventive role 
by increasing firm-wide awareness of ethics and regulatory issues.
9 According to a 
recently-appointed general counsel, “A lot of law firms have a lot of problems they 
don’t know about because there is no central repository for hearing them.”
10 
From a regulatory standpoint, the emergence of in-house compliance 
specialists is a pivotal development. Research in other organizational contexts 
shows that such specialists tend to promote the development of compliance 
procedures within firms,
11 and may play a leading role in defining industry 
                                                                                                                  
    4.  ALAS has played an important role in promoting the formal appointment of 
in-house compliance specialists. See Taylor, supra note 1, at A1. The title preferred by 
ALAS is “loss prevention partner.” We discuss the role of ALAS in Part IV, below.  
    5.  Personal communication with Creamer (May 9, 2002).  
    6.  See Epstein, supra note 1, at 1012 (stating that legal ethics “has become a 
substantive area of law requiring specialized expertise”); Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, 
Inside an In-House Legal Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 103, 
104 (2000) (stating that “in light of the increasing complexity of legal ethics issues, it makes 
no more sense to have everyone at the firm be an expert in legal ethics than it would to have 
everyone . . . be an expert in the details of ERISA . . .”).  
    7.  See Epstein, supra note 1, at 1012, 1018–24 (discussing the “growth in the 
number and size of awards for legal malpractice”); Taylor, supra note 1, at A1. 
    8.  Taylor, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting Steve C. Ellis of Arter & Hadden). 
    9.  See Epstein, supra note 1, at 1012, 1030–31 (discussing the ombudsman and 
risk management functions of in-house ethics advisors).  
  10.  Taylor, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting James D. Jordan of Munsch Hardt). 
  11.  See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1546, 1565 (1992) 
(finding that between 1964 and 1990, organizations with personnel departments created 
formal Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] policies at almost twice the rate of other 
organizations); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: 
The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1416–17, 
1434 (1990) [hereinafter Edelman, Legal Environments] (finding that the presence of 
personnel professionals significantly increased the rate at which organizations adopted due 
process protections in the late 1970s); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction 
of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 74–79 
(1992) (arguing that lawyers and other compliance specialists have a professional incentive 
to promote internal compliance procedures, even in the absence of a significant legal 
threat); John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal 
Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 807–08 (1996) (finding 
that personnel professionals and labor lawyers played a “sequential” role in promoting 
employers’ adoption of nonunion grievance procedures).  2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  561 
 
standards for compliance.
12 This research suggests that in-house specialists may 
shape the future of law firm regulation. Except for a few news stories,
13 however, 
and a description of in-house ethics advising at one Oregon law firm,
14 we know 
virtually nothing about the work of such specialists or their role within law firms.  
This paper investigates the emerging role of compliance specialists in 
large law firms. The paper is based on focus groups
15 and interviews
16 with ethics 
advisors, general counsel, and other compliance specialists in a non-random 
sample of thirty-two law firms ranging in size from seventy-five to 1,000-plus 
lawyers
17 and headquartered in twelve different cities.
18 Our sample can best be 
described as a “snowball” (or “reputational”) sample,
19 in that we asked a small 
number of bar leaders and ethics specialists known to us to recommend 
                                                                                                                  
  12.  See Edelman, Legal Environments,  supra note 11, at 1434 (finding that 
personnel professionals played a central role in “transforming legal norms into 
organizational policy”); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: 
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 412–45 (1999) [hereinafter 
Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation] (finding that lawyers and personnel 
professionals promoted the adoption of nonunion grievance procedures before such 
procedures had any legal value as a defense to EEO claims); Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. 
Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 498–501 
(1997) [hereinafter Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments] (reviewing research on the 
role of lawyers and other compliance professionals in constructing organizational standards 
for “compliance”); see also Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 
AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983) (discussing the role of professional groups in shaping 
organizational norms).  
  13.  See sources cited supra note 1.  
  14.  See Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 6 (describing their own in-house ethics 
practice at Stoel Rives LLP); see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 1041–42 (discussing Jarvis’ 
practice at Stoel Rives). 
  15.  Most of our data come from three focus groups of ten to fifteen participants 
each. In addition to in-house compliance specialists, some focus groups included bar 
regulators, insurers, and other academics. Each focus group began with an informal dinner 
for participants and continued the next day with two formal sessions of 90–120 minutes 
each. We label the focus groups A, B and C, and refer to participants in each focus group by 
a unique number (e.g., A1, A2, B1, etc). 
  16.  We supplemented the focus group data with follow-up interviews with some 
participants. Our sample also includes three people who did not participate in the focus 
groups, but whom we interviewed individually by telephone. These interviews lasted thirty 
to sixty minutes each. We refer to interview subjects with the letter I and a unique number 
(i.e., I1, I2, and I3). 
  17.  The breakdown of firms by size category is: 75–150 lawyers (five firms); 
151–250 lawyers (six firms); 251–500 lawyers (ten firms); 500–1,000 lawyers (seven 
firms); 1,000-plus lawyers (four firms). 
  18.  The cities with more than one firm in the sample are New York City (ten 
firms); Boston (six firms); Chicago (four firms); Philadelphia (three firms); and 
Washington, D.C. (two firms).  
  19.  See Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL 
STAT. 148 (1961) (defining snowball sampling); Charles Kadushin, Power, Influence and 
Social Circles: A New Methodology for Studying Opinion Makers, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 685, 
694–96 (1968) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of snowball sampling). 562  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 44:559 
 
 
participants for our study; then asked these participants for more names, and so on; 
until we felt that we had enough data to present interesting preliminary findings. 
All but four of the participants in our study spend at least 300–500 hours per year 
on in-house compliance work,
20 and half spend significantly more (or all) of their 
time on this function. The research was conducted between May 2001 and March 
2002.  
Our exploratory analysis is organized around three sets of questions. First, 
to what extent is “compliance specialist” a coherent unit of analysis? Does it make 
sense to lump together “ethics advisors,” “general counsel,” “loss prevention 
partners,” “conflicts committee chairs,” and other lawyers whose titles seem to 
indicate a diverse set of management roles? To what extent do different titles 
correspond to different roles?  
Second, what is the typical structure of the compliance specialist’s 
position? Are most specialists members of committees or are they primarily 
alternatives to committees? Are most specialists also practicing lawyers; that is, do 
they also have outside clients? Do firms compensate practicing lawyers for in-
house compliance work? To what extent do structural variations affect the scope of 
the specialists’ role? To what extent do structural variations reflect the needs 
(versus the values) of the firm? What are the strengths and weaknesses of different 
structural arrangements?  
Finally, what are the personal and professional characteristics of in-house 
compliance specialists? At what stage in their careers do lawyers typically take on 
this role? Do in-house specialists tend to come from similar practice backgrounds? 
Do they share a common attitude toward their role(s) within the firm? To what 
extent do in-house specialists interact with each other professionally?  
Our analysis is based on self-reports by specialists and therefore is 
primarily descriptive rather than evaluative. The chief goals of the paper are to 
identify questions for more systematic empirical analysis, and to call attention to 
the potential importance of in-house compliance specialists for law firm 
regulation. We believe that the profession’s current approach to law firm 
discipline,
21 which relies on case-by-case enforcement by state disciplinary 
                                                                                                                  
  20.  Four participants reported that they spend less than 300 hours per year on in-
house compliance work. One is retired and based his comments on his previous role as a 
malpractice defense lawyer and chair of his firm’s ethics committee for ten years; one is an 
associate being groomed to take over from the current in-house specialist; one is a member 
of a firm-wide ethics committee who serves as the point person for his seventy-lawyer 
office; and one is a member of a four-person ethics committee that rotates the “point 
person” role every month. 
  21.  Professor Ted Schneyer was the first to call for “professional discipline” for 
law firms, in his classic article by the same title. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline 
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991). Schneyer called for the imposition of a firm-
level duty of supervision under Model Rule 5.1(a), which currently imposes supervisory 
duties only on individual partners. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) 
(2000) (requiring law firm partners to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the 
Rules of Professional Conduct”). Subsequent debate within the profession about the 
regulation of law firms as entities has focused narrowly on the question of whether to 2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  563 
 
authorities,
22 is out of step with regulatory approaches in other organizational 
contexts. We want to explore an alternative model of “enforced self-regulation” by 
firms,
23  which would rely heavily on in-house compliance specialists.
24 By 
studying the work of such specialists and their emerging role within firms, we 
hope to contribute to their effectiveness, and to effective self-regulation by firms. 
II. “COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS” AS A UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Large organizations tend to respond to complex and/or ambiguous 
regulation by turning to in-house compliance specialists—such as, for instance, 
corporate counsel
25—to define the threat of liability and design the appropriate 
organizational response. For instance, studies of employers’ responses to equal 
employment opportunity (EEO) legislation show that lawyers and personnel 
professionals played a critical role in defining employers’ initial strategies for 
compliance, and in spreading particular compliance structures among firms.
26 The 
literature on corporate compliance likewise shows that internal “compliance 
                                                                                                                  
impose an entity duty under Rule 5.1(a). See, e.g., E THICS 2000 COMMISSION, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, CHANGES FROM THE NOVEMBER 2000 REPORT TO THE MAY 2001 REPORT, available 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-chan_jun.html; ETHICS  2000 COMMISSION, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, FINAL  REPORT, June 9, 2001, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
mlove_article.html (rejecting a proposal to amend Rule 5.1(a)). 
  22.  New York and New Jersey have amended their rules of professional conduct 
to impose a duty of supervision on law firms. See N . J .  R .  P ROF'L  CONDUCT  5.1; N.Y. 
JUDICIARY LAW DR 1-104 (McKinney 2001).  
  23.  See I AN  AYRES  & JOHN  BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE  REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION  DEBATE 101–32 (1992) (defining “enforced self-
regulation” and discussing its strengths and weaknesses as a regulatory strategy); John 
Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1980). Under enforced self-regulation, “each firm . . . is required to 
propose its own regulatory standards if it is to avoid harsher (and less tailored) standards 
imposed by the state.” AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra, at 101.  
  24.  See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity 
Regulation, 4 LEGAL ETHICS 45, 56–64 (U.K.) (2002) (criticizing the ABA’s command-and-
control approach to entity regulation and calling for more institutional support for in-house 
compliance specialists); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for 
Law Firm Discipline, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2003) (proposing that law firms 
be encouraged to invest in in-house compliance specialists); see also A YRES  & 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23, at 125–28 (stating that “an independent internal compliance 
group is essential to the success of an enforced self-regulation scheme”). 
  25.  See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyering 
for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1057, 1059–
63 (1997) (discussing the growth in the number of corporate counsel in the 1970s and 1980s 
and the expansion of their “regulatory counseling” function). 
  26.  See, e.g., Edelman, Legal Environments, supra note 11, at 1416–17, 1434 
(discussing the role of personnel professionals); Sutton & Dobbin, supra note 11, at 807–08 
(discussing the “sequential” role of personnel professionals and labor lawyers); Edelman et. 
al.,  Endogeneity of Legal Regulation,  supra note 12, at 408 (finding that professional 
“stories about the legal value of [nonunion] grievance procedures . . . influence both 
organizational adoption of the procedures and legal considerations by courts”).  564  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 44:559 
 
 
professionals” play an increasingly central role in corporate self-regulation.
27 This 
literature suggests that as law firms grow larger and professional regulation grows 
more complex, we should see the emergence of in-house specialists charged with 
managing firms’ compliance, and an increasing role for such specialists in law 
firm management.   
The professional development of compliance specialists may be a gradual 
process, however. In the early stages, there may be substantial variation in 
specialists’ titles and status within firms, and little external networking or 
professional organization among specialists.
28 Further, like any professional group, 
the success of in-house compliance specialists in establishing themselves—and 
their authority—within firms depends in part on the extent to which they mobilize 
around a viable market niche.
29 The status of corporate counsel, for instance, has 
changed substantially since the early days when they were called “kept” lawyers 
and viewed primarily as individuals who could not make partner in law firms.
30 
Our research suggests that the professional development of compliance 
specialists is just beginning in law firms. All of the firms in our sample rely on in-
                                                                                                                  
  27.  See J OHN  BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE  CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 139, 143–49 (1984) (discussing the role of “quality control directors” in the 
pharmaceutical industry); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-
REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 60–61 (1988) (discussing the role of compliance 
personnel in occupational health and safety regulation); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better 
Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1213, 1235–52 (2000) (discussing the increasing use of “gatekeeper enforcement strategies” 
in corporate governance); Barra Little, Consultants and Lawyers in a Professional No-
Man’s Land (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting the use of 
internal conflicts specialists in consulting firms); Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via 
Business Deregulation: Compliance Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT. J. 
LEG. PROF. 175, 177–88 (1999) (discussing the rise of “compliance professionalism” in the 
U.S. and the U.K.). 
  28.  See, e.g., James N. Baron et al., War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern 
Personnel Administration in U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J. SOC. 250, 300 (1986) (examining the 
early development of the personnel profession); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel 
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 n.1 
(1989) (tracing the development of the “corporate counsel” title from “kept” counsel in the 
1920s, to “house” counsel in the 1930s, to “corporate” counsel beginning around 1945). 
  29.  See generally ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON 
THE EXPERT DIVISION OF LABOR 33–113 (1988) (arguing that professions develop through 
“jurisdictional” claims in the workplace, in public, and in law); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, 
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 180 (1977) (arguing that “the 
main instrument of professional advancement . . . is the capacity to claim esoteric and 
identifiable skills . . . . The claim of expertise aims at gaining social recognition and 
collective prestige which, in turn, are implicitly used by the individual to assert his authority 
and command respect in the context of everyday transactions . . . ”).  
  30.  See Rosen, supra note 28, at 481–89; Daly, supra note 25, at 1059–66 
(discussing changes in the professional status of American corporate counsel); see also 
Mary Adelman Legg, The In-House Life, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 18 (reporting the 
results of the American Lawyer’s 2001 General Counsel Compensation Survey, which 
found that the 100 highest paid general counsel received an average of more than $1million 
in salary and bonuses in 2000, not including stock options). 2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  565 
 
house compliance specialists to some extent; indeed, we chose the firms on that 
basis. In most firms, however, the specialist’s role has “evolved” (rather than being 
“created”) and many specialists’ positions have been formalized only recently. 
Further, specialists’ titles vary substantially and have only a loose correspondence 
with their functional roles. Thus, while the firms in our sample clearly are moving 
toward the use of in-house compliance specialists, there is not yet an industry 
standard regarding specialists’ titles or roles. We therefore define our unit of 
analysis in broad, functional terms. 
A. The Emergence of In-House Compliance Specialists 
All the firms in our sample have at least one partner with special 
responsibility for promoting ethics and/or regulatory compliance within the firm. 
In most firms (twenty-six out of thirty-two), the position is formal, in that the 
specialist has a formal title and the responsibility does not rotate; however, in all 
firms, the specialist’s role is recognized informally throughout the firm (as in “he’s 
our ethics guy”).  
Most participants emphasized the “evolutionary” nature of their positions. 
Typically, among those with formal titles, the position began informally and 
expanded over time as a concomitant of firm growth. Thus, in most cases, the 
formalization of participants’ positions was a recognition of their functional role, 
rather than the product of proactive design. The following comment is illustrative: 
Go to any firm around the country and you’ll find a different way in 
which the ethics function evolves in that firm, that’s consistent with 
that firm’s practice, consistent with the firm’s structure generally 
and consistent with the culture of the firm . . . . At [my firm], when I 
joined the firm 20 years ago, there was a senior partner with a copy 
of the Model Code in his office and that was the ethics department. 
And that was outdated even then, in a firm of 180 lawyers. Then, 
another senior partner succeeded in that role and started grooming 
me to take over since I had an interest in the field. And before long, 
people stopped going to him and started coming to me . . . I have 
taken the title of ethics partner just to have something to call myself, 
but I have never been officially appointed anything. There is no 
ethics committee. A few years ago . . . I suggested we form a 
committee and the response from the executive committee was, 
“What would the ethics committee do? It would just rubber stamp 
everything you say.” I haven’t, quite frankly, done anything to push 
it because I’m happy having people view me as indispensable. [A4] 
One indication of the emergent nature of the in-house compliance 
specialist’s role is the wide variation in participants’ titles. Some titles are so 
idiosyncratic that to list them might jeopardize participants’ anonymity; however, 
the more generic titles in our sample include: firm counsel, general counsel, or 
attorney to the firm (n=10); ethics partner, ethics advisor or professional 
responsibility advisor (n=7); chair or co-chair of the ethics or professional 
responsibility committee (n=9); conflicts partner or chair of the conflicts 
committee (n=4); risk management or loss prevention partner (n=3); pro bono 
partner or pro bono coordinator (n=3); and ombudsman (n=1). Many participants 566  ARIZONA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 44:559 
 
 
(n=12) have more than one title indicating an ethics or regulatory function (for 
instance, firm counsel and loss prevention partner). 
Further, participants’ titles correspond only loosely to their functional 
roles. Some participants have outgrown their titles as their specialist role has 
evolved. Some participants’ titles are new and have yet to be institutionally 
defined. In many firms, the role and jurisdiction of related committees is in flux. 
Thus, as we discuss in the next two sections, participants’ titles are not a reliable 
basis for functional classification. 
B. The Relationship Between Title and Substantive Jurisdiction 
One of our central questions going into the study was what kinds of 
substantive issues in-house specialists address. Previous studies of the 
development of ethical infrastructure in law firms find that most firms have special 
structures for managing conflicts of interest (such as conflicts procedures and 
committees),
31 but that firms may invest relatively little in other types of ethical 
infrastructure.
32 For instance, a 1995 survey of 191 Texas law firms found that 
most firms do not monitor partners’ compliance with internal procedures other 
than conflicts and billing procedures, and only half of the firms engage in any form 
of peer review.
33 Similarly, a 1997 survey of thirty-one law firms found that 
twenty-five have a conflicts partner, but only eight have an ethics committee that 
meets on a regular (versus ad hoc) basis.
34 This literature suggests that conflicts of 
interest (and related issues such as client intake and lateral hiring) may be the 
primary substantive jurisdiction for most in-house specialists. 
On the other hand, Peter Jarvis and Mark Fucile, in describing their own 
in-house ethics practice, report that they provide individual counseling on a wide 
range of issues, including conflicts and intake (which they list first); attorney-client 
privilege and work product; advertising and solicitation; communication with 
represented parties; lateral hiring and departure; fees, billing and trust accounts; 
mandatory and permissive withdrawal; and the duty to report misconduct by other 
                                                                                                                  
  31.  See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? 
An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 
285 (1997) (reporting that seventy-five percent of 191 Texas law firms surveyed 
periodically monitor partners’ compliance with conflicts procedures); Lee A. Pizzimenti, 
Screen Verite: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm 
Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI  L. REV. 305, 322 (1997) (reporting that all thirty-one firms 
surveyed have a “well-developed system for detecting conflicts”); Stephen R. Volk et al., 
Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis of a 
Survey of Law Firms, 48 BUS. LAW. 1567, 1571–81 (1993) (reporting that all twenty-six law 
firms surveyed have a formal system for managing conflicts of interest).  
  32.  See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 691, 697–99 (2002) (analyzing recent surveys on the development of ethical 
infrastructure in large law firms). 
  33.  See Fortney, supra note 31, at 284–85, 289–90. 
  34.  See Pizzimenti, supra note 31, at 322. Because of the small sample size, we 
report raw numbers rather than percentages.  2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  567 
 
lawyers.
35 Moreover, in addition to individual counseling, Jarvis and Fucile alert 
the firm to regulatory developments, help the firm develop standardized forms 
(such as conflicts waivers), provide in-house ethics training, publish a quarterly 
professional responsibility newsletter, maintain intranet and internet resources, 
and—when necessary—respond to bar complaints and motions for 
disqualification.
36 Their description suggests a much broader substantive 
jurisdiction for in-house specialists.  
As we discuss in Part III, we found that this spectrum—from “conflicts” 
to “broader”—was a useful spectrum for crudely classifying participants’ 
substantive jurisdictions. As we discuss in this section, however, participants’ titles 
do not necessarily correspond to their place on the spectrum. In some firms, for 
instance, the “ethics partner” focuses primarily on conflicts of interest; in others, 
the “ethics partner” handles a broad range of issues. As one participant put it: 
When you talk about “ethics,” some people are just talking about 
conflicts and that’s the only thing they—their firm—deals with. 
Others are talking about a wide range of things . . . So I don’t think 
when a firm talks about fulfilling its ethics function, that it—that 
two firms necessarily envision it the same way. [A13] 
Likewise, in a number of firms, the jurisdiction of the “conflicts 
committee” has expanded over time in response to issues that come up in the firm. 
The following account is typical: 
It started as a process of conflicts . . . [and] evolved from that, as the 
firm grew, and the complexity of these issues grew, kind of like the 
common law grows, incrementally. Until three years ago the entity   
. . . fairly randomly, continued to be called the conflicts committee. 
I made a little list last night of the kinds of things that had come to 
that committee . . . beyond . . . intake issues. The committee became 
a professional responsibility committee in fact, although not in name 
. . . [as] other problems . . . arose . . . . [B3] 
In fact, some participants had trouble defining their own jurisdictions. 
One participant, who is the chair of his firm’s ethics committee, said: 
I don’t think you could find a piece of paper in our firm that defines 
the jurisdiction of the ethics committee. There is no such official 
charge . . . It kind of developed, I would say, because of how the 
particular managing partner . . . structured [it], as well as what other 
people have come to me about . . . At this point, I’ve been doing this 
for five years, and so it has taken on a life of its own. [C1] 
The looseness of the match between title and jurisdiction was reflected in 
some participants’ response to our initial invitation to participate in a focus group 
for “in-house ethics advisors.” Several participants suggested that we ought to talk 
to someone else in the firm (for instance, “Oh, you want the conflicts partner,” or 
“Oh, you want the general counsel”). This response did not come from people with 
any particular set of responsibilities but rather, it seems, from the lack of a 
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standard title or jurisdiction for the role that we are studying. (We subsequently 
amended our invitation to include additional titles.)  
C. The Relationship Between Title and the Role of Committees 
Participants’ titles also do not reliably indicate the role of committees, or 
the presence or absence of other types of ethical infrastructure in the firm. Some 
participants are “chairs” of committees, but they do the bulk of the committee’s 
work. As one chair of his firm’s ethics committee observes: 
We have a committee, two members of which are supposedly the 
ethics panel for the week, but by and large, ninety-nine percent of 
the time, if I am in the office, the call will not go to the two people 
who are on this week’s panel, it will come to me. That one percent 
of the time when it goes to the other two people on the panel, they 
might say, maybe you want to call [the speaker], when he gets back 
to the office. [Laughter.] [B10] 
In other cases, the in-house specialist co-exists with a committee, but the 
committee rarely meets. The following example comes from a participant with 
several titles, including “conflicts partner”:  
We do have an ethics committee at [my firm] but it doesn’t meet . . .  
except under extraordinary circumstances. [Instead] there are three 
of us who spend a fair amount of time on ethics work. I spend 
almost all my time. [A7] 
Finally, many firms have more than one partner who acts as an in-house 
compliance specialist, as well as one or more functioning committees, again with 
wide variation in titles and jurisdictional divisions. Consider the following 
descriptions of the “general counsel” position: 
In my case, I’m general counsel of the firm. The professional 
responsibility committee deals with conflicts, practice statements, 
fiduciary positions, client intake issues, things of that sort. My role 
deals with risk management, claims, firm governance, employment 
problems, partner issues, departures. Like you expect . . . there is a 
fair amount of overlap . . .  [B11] 
I combine the corporate counsel function with the ethics function 
and I’m backed up by two partners who have extensive ethics 
experience and they’re large resources as to consultation and handle 
things when I am out of town. I handle the claims aspect too. And 
any disciplinary matters, which fortunately don’t happen too often. 
[A2] 
[In my firm] the counsel to the firm is more the business lawyer for 
the firm . . . We have a loss prevention partner too, and there, there 
is more overlap [with my position as ethics partner] . . . I’m gone 
today and tomorrow and he’s answering . . . questions in my 
absence, [just as] I would in his absence. [A14] 
We explore the strengths and weaknesses of various structural 
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titles do not have common definitions across firms, and may reveal relatively little 
about the substance and structure of the specialist’s role.  
D. Some Exceptions to the Evolutionary Model 
Participants did report some exceptions to the “evolution” of their 
positions. Three participants proactively lobbied for and designed their own jobs. 
Two cases involved female litigation partners who created their own full-time in-
house positions, in part so that they could take time to raise children.
37 The third 
case involved a partner on the management committee who lobbied for what 
eventually became a full-time “conflicts” position. He recounts: 
When I was on the management committee—this was about 15 
years ago—there was a senior partner in his 70s who was doing our 
conflicts of interest work and I began to get concerned. He was 
spending more time on the golf course than worrying about conflicts 
and I shadowed his work for a number of months and finally 
reported to my colleagues that somebody else ought to do it and of 
course, they appointed me. And I began to get fascinated by 
conflicts of interest . . . . Each of our offices outside [the main office 
location] has someone who is fairly conversant, but we are quite 
centralized also. It evolved as malpractice problems in large and 
smaller firms became much more acute and conflicts in particular 
became an extremely important part of those proceedings. We saw 
that we institutionally needed to have a tight ship. We do all the 
conflicts clearance out of [the main office location] and that’s—it’s 
an evolution and reactive, I guess to what was going on in the 
profession—but it was a planned management procedure. [A7] 
Another exception to the evolutionary model involved a merger. One 
participant’s position was created as part of a set of strategic decisions for 
managing a merger with another firm. As in the previous example, the position 
created was a full-time position for managing conflicts of interest. As this “general 
counsel” explained: 
When we went through the combination . . . things got a lot non-
evolutionary. We sat down and said well, we have [hundreds of] 
lawyers in [other jurisdictions] . . . all doing conflicts                         
differently . . . . At that point, a whole lot of people got different 
jobs because this is going to be centralized, there weren’t going to 
be cowboys, there couldn’t be cowboys . . . . No more clearing your 
own conflicts. It was a huge jerk for most people . . . . We knew that 
conflicts was going to be the largest issue . . . and if we didn’t get it 
right it was going to be a big, big problem. [A8]  
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Law Firms and in the Legal Profession, 72 NEB. L. REV. 760, 786–89 (1993) (reviewing 
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Taken together, these exceptions illustrate two sets of incentives for the 
proactive creation of in-house compliance positions: the personal and professional 
interests of individual lawyers; and managers’ concerns about liability for conflicts 
of interest. Significantly, all four exceptions involve full-time, compensated 
positions, which necessarily require a proactive management decision. 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, however, the general pattern reported by 
participants was one of ad hoc evolution and expansion into increasingly formal 
positions, with wide variation in position titles and roles. We now turn to the 
structure of specialists’ positions within firms.  
III. THE STRUCTURE OF SPECIALISTS’ POSITIONS WITHIN FIRMS 
Obviously, law firm management structure is partly a function of 
organizational imperatives such as size and the number of offices. As firms have 
grown, they have moved increasingly toward formal, centralized management by 
full-time managing partners and other non-practicing specialists.
 38 Thus, we would 
expect firm size to be an important determinant of firms’ investment in in-house 
compliance specialists.
39  
Size is not everything, however. Many lawyers are resistant to the 
rationalization of law firm management, because it constrains individual autonomy 
and creates a hierarchy among partners, which conflicts with the democratic 
premise of the partnership form.
40 Thus, many firms remain committed to 
decentralized management-by-committee, in which partners rotate management 
responsibilities while maintaining their own full-time practices.
41 Such firms may 
                                                                                                                  
  38.  See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
BIG LAW FIRM 48-49 (1991); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 147–50 (1988) (discussing large law firms’ 
tendency toward bureaucratic organization and management); Steven Brill, The End of 
Partnership?, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 3 (discussing firms’ increasing use of full-time 
managing partners); Mike France, Managing Partner: The Tender Trap, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 
1995, at A1 (stating that “almost all [large firms] have one full-time (or nearly full-time) 
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LEGAL TIMES, May 21, 2001, at 41 (discussing firms’ use of professional managers); see 
also James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of 
the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 466–71 (1989) (discussing firms’ increasing use of 
management consultants).  
  39.  See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 31, at 289, 289 n.107 (finding that firms with 
fifty or more lawyers are more likely than smaller firms to have a designated ethics partner 
or committee); see also Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 32, at 700 (discussing the 
relationship between firm size and ethical infrastructure). 
  40.  See N ELSON,  supra note 38, at 86–124, 231–90 (discussing the tension 
between bureaucratic management and professional ideology). 
  41.  See, e.g., Renee Deger, Four Gray Cary Partners Elected to Management 
Team, AM. LAW., Oct. 19, 2000, at 6 (discussing Gray Cary’s commitment to decentralized 
management).   2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  571 
 
be unlikely to invest in compliance specialists, especially on a full-time basis.
42 As 
one participant explains: 
Many of the functions in our firm are still handled by committees of 
lawyers for whom it is not their principal job, who do it as a 
committee in order to share the burden with other lawyers, and not 
as a substantial part of their time, and for whom the function is not a 
major element in their compensation, on the theory that each of us is 
performing some administrative role . . . . So one thing that occurs 
to me is . . . it is not so much a size-of-the-firm issue as a 
management-style-of-the-firm issue. [B9] 
Some question whether law firms—especially large firms—can continue 
to get away with “taking turns” as a management strategy.
43 In an era of eat-what-
you-kill compensation and intense pressure for client intake, busy partners may 
have little incentive to take on uncompensated management roles. Even the role of 
managing partner reportedly has become harder to fill.
44 As a result, some argue, 
large law firms tend to be under-managed.
45  
At the same time, there may be benefits to decentralized management, 
especially in the compliance context, because it involves more partners in 
promoting compliance within the firm. As one senior partner explains:  
We have a managerial point of view that favors committee     
structure . . . . We have a hiring committee, we have a compensation 
committee, we have, of course, an executive committee, we have a 
billing committee, we have a bunch of other committees. We’re 
something now close to 500 lawyers . . . . If you have a committee 
that deals with this kind of thing over time, and you have a stream 
of partners that serve on it over time, you will, over time, have a 
relatively well-sensitized partnership . . . . My experience is that we 
have probably twenty alumni of the [professional responsibility] 
committee in the partnership who understand these issues from 
having had to deal with them, and therefore are reasonably good 
missionaries to others who have not yet done it in creating a culture 
and a compliance attitude. [B3] 
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This section examines the structure of specialists’ positions within firms, 
and considers some strengths and weaknesses of different structural arrangements. 
We first consider the issue of compensation, and the effect of direct compensation 
on the scope of the specialist’s role. We then examine the relationship between 
firm size and the level of firm investment in specialists and other ethical 
infrastructure. Finally, we consider some strengths and weaknesses of specialists 
versus committees, and of practicing versus full-time specialists.  
A. Compensation Structure 
Some firms view in-house compliance work as part of partners’ general 
duties to the firm, and do not compensate partners directly for significant in-house 
advising. As participants from such firms explained: 
You’re expected as an attorney, and then as a partner, to pick up 
administrative duties around the firm, and that was one of the things 
I ended up doing. [B1] 
The cliché in firms like this is that we are all owners, and this is part 
of the ownership function. [B2] 
In-house service may be credited indirectly for compensation purposes, 
but most participants were uncertain as to whether and how this occurs:  
We have firm management time: that’s sort of an office billing that 
you do, which is completely ignored, I’m certain . . . [at] 
compensation time. [B7] 
I would say that I am compensated for what I do, but I could never 
tell you how much. It’s part of a tradition in the firm that’s really 
like the one [another speaker] referred to. We’ve had a long practice 
of people serving on committees and performing various 
administrative functions, for which I am sure they all feel 
compensated, to some degree . . . [B6] 
According to one participant, compensation for in-house service consists 
primarily of avoiding a penalty for refusing an administrative burden: 
The percentage committee . . . from time to time, [has] explained 
how they arrive at percentages, and I still don’t understand it 
[laughter]. The result is that most partners are afraid to do anything 
bad because they think it might [count] against them. They’re not 
sure, but just to be on the safe side. So that’s how compensation is 
handled. [B5] 
In other firms, practicing partners bill the firm directly for the time that 
they spend on in-house compliance work, and such time counts equally with 
outside billings for compensation purposes. As one part-time in-house counsel 
explained, “I have an internal billing number for every in-house matter.” [I3] This 2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  573 
 
is the system described by Jarvis and Fucile in their article about their own in-
house practice.
46 
Finally, some firms have full-time specialists who maintain no outside 
practice and are compensated only for in-house compliance work. In fact, one full-
time general counsel, who occasionally does work for previous clients, turns over 
his outside earnings to the firm: 
In terms of my compensation, I agreed a few years ago—I kind of 
evolved into this role, as did the other guy . . . . I’m still a partner, 
but I have given up my rights to be compensated like a partner. In 
fact, I’m incentivized not to practice at all, but I still practice . . . for 
a couple of clients . . . I bill my time because I’m still providing 
services to the clients, but whatever I bill I give back to the firm, so 
that there’s no issue that I really want to spend more time on this 
matter because I can make money doing it. [B11] 
Thus, most of the participants in our study can be characterized as one of 
three structural types: practicing lawyers who are not compensated directly for in-
house compliance work (n=14); practicing lawyers who are compensated for in-
house compliance work (n=5); and full-time specialists with no outside practice, 
who are compensated only for in-house compliance work (n=10).
47  
B. The Effect of Direct Compensation on the Scope of the Specialist’s Role 
Not surprisingly, the structure of compensation affects the scope of 
participants’ roles. As we expected, most participants’ core substantive jurisdiction 
is conflicts: all of the firms in our sample have special infrastructure for managing 
conflicts of interest; and two participants from very large firms are full-time 
conflicts specialists. The extent to which participants address issues other than 
conflicts, however, appears to be closely related to whether they are compensated 
for in-house work.  
Practicing lawyers who are not compensated directly for in-house 
compliance work focus primarily on answering questions and tend to be protective 
of their time. Most report that the vast majority of questions that they handle are 
conflicts questions. Consider the following description from a participant in a 200-
lawyer office: 
I am the chairman of a committee of three partners and an 
associated staff member [who compose] the professional 
responsibility committee . . . . For the most part we deal with issues 
under the rules of professional responsibility. A vast majority of 
what we do is conflicts work. What we are primarily called upon to 
do is to help analyze a conflict, help work through the procedures to 
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get it resolved or determine that we can’t take on the matter. That is 
less than the list of things that some other people . . . do. [B9] 
Further, most participants who are not compensated for in-house 
compliance work are the only—or primary—resource in their firm. The following 
statement comes from the ethics partner in the 375-lawyer main office of a 500-
lawyer firm: 
I’m not a full-timer at this. I spend about 400, 500 hours a year . . . 
on the in-house ethics function. And I’m the only person who does 
it so those are the only hours being spent on the function . . . . [A4] 
As a result, uncompensated participants tend to characterize their in-
house work as a “burden.” The following comments are typical:  
If I were to lump all my time together, I’d say I spend about one-
third of my time on this . . . It’s non-billable time. That’s a burden. 
[C1] 
I’m always bumping around 500 hours per year. My total hours, 
billable and non-billable, usually bumping 2,500, 2,400. A terrible 
burden. The 500 hours, I would tell you, on a year-to-year basis, 
over the last maybe 10 years, is almost all reactive time . . . . It’s 
sort of one of my complaints, because it doesn’t give me much 
chance, or anyone in the firm much chance, to spend time thinking 
proactively about policies and procedures. We probably have some 
gaps as a result of that. [C2] 
Some participants complained in particular about the intrusion of non-conflicts 
questions: 
Conflicts tend to dominate because it is regular and it is always 
there. There are also big money issues and usually somebody is 
getting disappointed or there is the potential for that. But the other 
stuff is there and it is quite annoying [laughter]. [A8] 
Participants who are compensated directly, on the other hand, tend to play 
a much broader and more proactive role in their firms. In addition to answering 
individual questions, compensated participants report that they monitor internal 
systems, provide in-house training, and develop reference materials, much as 
Jarvis and Fucile describe in their article.
48 For instance, consider the following 
robust job description from a compensated ethics partner in the 300-lawyer main 
office of a 700-lawyer firm:  
I have spent an awful lot of time developing our intranet site as an 
ethics and loss prevention library. We have links to every third party 
source I can find, the rules of all states, the opinions and Cornell 
kind of stuff [referring to the legal ethics section of the Cornell web 
site], but also more specialized things that are increasingly 
becoming available. And then the materials I have created . . . . I 
have, say, an outline on each of the major Rules of Professional 
Conduct and if somebody said, “well, what’s the rule on such and 
such, can you contact a former employee under Rule 4.2,” I may 
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well have that on hand . . . . And then you’re able to say to people, 
“here’s the answer and here’s why . . . and I’m not making this up as 
I go along.” If I did a job description I would have a section on 
systems monitoring and systems planning. That is, I spend a certain 
amount of time making sure our trust account is working the way it 
is supposed to . . . you can’t just leave that to the accounting people. 
I review—more than I care to—our marketing materials and web 
site and that sort of thing because it is easy to—especially when you 
are in a lot of different jurisdictions the way we are—to say 
something on your central web site that, there’s some stupid rule in 
some state that says you can’t say that kind of thing . . . . We do a 
fair amount of non-lawyer ethics training too, and I think that’s 
important . . . because the people in marketing and trust accounts 
and so forth . . . how do you know what is going on or what is not 
coming to your attention? . . . Try getting all the secretaries in the 
firm together and tell them what proper notarization practice is, and 
see if you don’t get a few phone calls afterwards . . . I’d say about 
two thirds of my time or maybe sixty percent is for the firm . . . . 
[A14] 
Firms that compensate in-house specialists on a part-time or full-time 
basis also tend to have more extensive ethical infrastructure than firms that do not. 
For instance, several full-time specialists in our sample are backed up by active 
committees and/or other compliance specialists. The part-time ethics partner 
quoted above ticks off the following ethical infrastructure in his firm: 
We have a pro bono partner and employee benefits. Somebody 
counsels to the firm. Professional development partner, and myself. 
I was initially both professional development, training, and ethics 
partner. And I had my own ethics clientele. And I thought I could do 
all three things. And I really couldn’t, and that was when there were 
300 lawyers and now there are 700. So somewhere along the way I 
stopped being professional development partner and just have the 
ethics partner and my own clientele. [A14] 
In fact, a number of compensated participants reported that the 
coordination of internal resources is a central part of their role. Several used the 
term “point person” to refer to this role. One full-time specialist said: 
I think the firm looked at [the creation of my] position as having a 
point person. You can decide if it is a point person or a lightening 
rod  . . but a person that’s out there that can serve as . . . the first 
point of contact . . . sort of a locus point for people to come to with 
all sorts of different questions on all sorts of different topics, from 
senior people to the most junior people . . . . Having been around 
since 1984 when I started, and always having been at the same firm, 
even in the summers, if it’s not in my jurisdiction, I know where to 
send it. So I have that sort of—mediator is not the right word but—
facilitator role. [B4]  
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And from a part-time, compensated specialist:  
In our firm, the general counsel position is new, the position is only 
three or four years old . . . Obviously I don’t do everything myself, 
but I know the partners in the firm to whom I can turn for expert 
opinions. And that is one of my critical roles . . . To some extent my 
job is coordinating. [A10] 
It appears, therefore, that the firms’ investment in in-house compliance 
specialists is related to their overall investment in ethical infrastructure, as well as 
to the underlying management structure of the firm.  
C. The Effect of Size 
In part, of course, the extent to which firms invest in in-house compliance 
specialists and other ethical infrastructure is a function of firm size. In general, the 
larger firms in our sample tend to have more ethical infrastructure than the smaller 
firms, and to be more likely to compensate in-house specialists. For instance, the 
average size of the firms in our sample that compensate in-house specialists is 
roughly 850 lawyers, whereas the average size of firms that do not is roughly 350 
lawyers.
49  
Firm investment is not simply a function of firm size, however. Of the 
eleven firms in our sample with over 500 lawyers, six compensate in-house 
specialists and four do not (we are missing data on one firm). Of the ten firms in 
our sample with full-time specialists, six have under 500 lawyers, and two have 
under 250 lawyers.  
In addition, we observed several interesting exchanges among focus 
group participants about the role of firm size in determining the need for in-house 
specialists. Some participants who perform in-house work as an uncompensated 
service to the firm initially were skeptical that there would be enough work to 
justify a full-time position. Consider the following remark, from a participant from 
a 200-lawyer firm, “I am here from one of the smaller groups. The notion of a full-
time person to do what I do, you know, they’d say, ‘what are you, nuts?’ Isn’t it 
basically a function of size?” [B8] 
Yet, a number of full-time specialists, including some from smaller firms, 
reported that once their position was created, they had no trouble filling their 
time.
50 In response to the above question, for instance, a full-time specialist from a 
500-plus lawyer firm said: 
I don’t know whether it’s exclusively a size issue or how you define 
the job. When the firm asked me, as a partner in the litigation area, 
to do this, back in 1993, on a full-time basis, I thought it sounded 
interesting, so I’ve done it. I have absolutely no trouble, with the 
size of our firm and the breadth of what I do, filling my day up quite 
fully with it. [B4] 
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Another full-time specialist, from a 400-lawyer firm, observed: 
The thing I notice is, there’s a lot more business now that we have 
made a resource available . . . we used to have a system where two 
of us would spend about 500 hours a year on conflicts, and maybe a 
third of that time on other professional responsibility matters. Now, 
in my new [full-time] position, I am astounded that I can’t get 
everything done in a day and I don’t think there are a lot of different 
issues than there used to be when we spent 1,000 hours on this. 
[A11] 
And from a part-time, compensated specialist in a 200-lawyer firm, “I don’t know 
how they managed without me!” [A9] 
Further, once uncompensated participants heard what the compensated 
participants do, many admitted that the same needs probably exist at their firms. In 
response to the robust job description quoted previously, for example, one 
uncompensated participant said: 
[A14’s comment] points out, I think almost painfully, the benefit of 
having a full time person. I mean, he said about ten things that I 
know I ought to be doing and I don’t—wouldn’t dream of                 
doing . . . . You know, things like reviewing the systems, trust 
accounts. I mean, the accounting department calls me occasionally 
with questions, and if anything they’re probably too picky, so I feel 
reasonably comfortable about it. But there probably could be some 
big hole in there that I don’t even realize is there. [A3]   
We heard similar comments from several other participants. One 
especially candid senior partner stated the point succinctly, “The decision as to 
how to deal with ethical issues in our firm is not dictated by the quantum of the 
work.” [B2] Thus, as one participant observed, there is no “industry standard” for 
the level of firm investment, even among firms of comparable size:  
What occurs to me as I am sitting here listening is there is no 
industry standard for this. It’s so clear, as we’re talking about it. I 
don’t know how many times I have said to either myself or a 
colleague: “I don’t believe that this firm goes to this length to deal 
with an ethics issue,” or “I can’t believe that this firm doesn’t go to 
this length” . . . . The spectrum is so broad. [A12]  
Instead, it appears that, for the most part, firms get what they pay for. 
Firms that do not compensate partners for in-house compliance work provide no 
economic incentive for partners to invest in the role, but rely instead on partners’ 
personal and professional commitments to the firm. This system may work to the 
extent that partners are personally committed: our sample includes two senior 
partners who invest a significant amount of their time in in-house compliance 
work, even though they are not compensated for this service by their firms. Several 
participants whose outside practices focus on professional liability also volunteer 
significant service to their firms. Without significant voluntary service by 
individual partners, however, participants’ comments suggest that a lack of direct 
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D. Some Strengths and Weaknesses of Different Structural Arrangements 
We now turn to two key structural variations among the sample firms: a 
reliance on specialists versus committees; and a reliance on full-time versus 
practicing specialists. The purpose of this section is to bracket the issue of overall 
firm investment, by assuming some optimal level of investment, and to consider 
separately the strengths and weaknesses of different structural forms. 
1. Specialists Versus Committees 
We first consider the strengths and weaknesses of specialists versus 
committees. A number of participants whose positions evolved from a larger 
committee cited efficiency as the primary motivation for the specialist form. For 
instance, the ethics partner with the robust job description, quoted above, explains 
the origins of his position as follows:  
My position was created in the early 90s . . . . The firm had decided 
that committees weren’t very efficient so it was going to spin off 
managerial responsibilities to the serious partners . . . . My 
predecessor was a four-member committee that kept minutes and 
you could just see, in today’s terms, $1600 bucks an hour ticking 
off. [A14] 
Participants also cited the increasing complexity of ethics and regulatory 
issues and the resulting need for individual specialization. According to a specialist 
whose outside practice focuses in part on professional liability issues: 
I think one reason, at least in my office, we started out with a larger 
committee and it came down to mostly my doing all the work . . . [is 
that] at least eighty to ninety percent of the inquiries I get, I know 
the answer or can work it through on my own . . . . Efficiencies 
alone suggest that one person is going to end up handling much of 
this. [C2] 
Finally, making a single partner responsible for the firm’s in-house 
compliance work makes it easier for the firm to evaluate the quality of that work 
and its cost. As one full-time specialist explains:  
Another reason why my position became, over time, full-time, is 
because at some point the notion was, let’s not have fifteen people 
on an ethics committee handling this, let’s have one person, because 
if we don’t like it we can jettison the person and, you know, we can 
identify what the cost is. [A12] 
Participants also cited some disadvantages of relying on specialists, 
however, and some comparative advantages of committees. For instance, a number 
of participants emphasized the drawbacks of having only one person available as a 
resource in the firm:  
I mean, one advantage of a committee is, if there is one person 
doing it and you go out of town or get sick, there is a big gap . . . . I 
mean, it’s nice to be indispensable, but . . . it’s a problem for the 
firm if there’s just one person in whom all the knowledge and all of 
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In addition to problems of coverage, the use of specialists involves fewer 
partners in day-to-day decisions and may serve to limit internal dialogue about 
ethical issues. As noted above, one of the advantages of management-by-
committee is that it involves a greater number of partners in internal compliance 
efforts and thus, over time, may help to produce a “well-sensitized partnership.”  
Committees also provide access to multiple perspectives, which may 
enhance the quality and legitimacy of decisions (especially in the conflicts area). 
Consider the following comments by participants who are backed up by 
committees: 
The committee will get involved in, I will say, deeper [matters]. For 
example, it can get involved in . . . conflicts issues that require more 
hands to be reviewing them . . . As everyone around the table 
knows, the rules can be read a lot of different ways, and a lot of 
different considerations can come into play, and sometimes there is 
a desire to have somebody more than [me] touch this one. 
Institutionally, we want to have that available. [B4] 
We have a conflicts committee that meets as needed. That usually 
occurs when there is a need for a collective decision or people are 
not as willing to accept my decision . . . There’s [also] the 
possibility of going to the management committee, if people really 
want to, but that doesn’t happen very often. [B6] 
Participants’ arguments about the relative benefits of specialists versus 
committees are important because they suggest some criteria for evaluating in-
house compliance efforts. The ideal system for managing compliance would 
combine the strengths associated with specialists (efficiency, expertise, and 
accountability) with the strengths associated with committees (coverage and 
partner participation).  
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the distinction between 
“specialists” and “committees.” As discussed in Part II, both specialists and 
committees come in many forms and most firms have hybrid structures. For 
instance, how would one characterize a multi-office committee, with one member 
per office? We encountered several examples of this structure in our sample:  
We have a firm-wide ethics committee. Each office has someone on 
the committee. We don’t [meet]. Occasionally—very 
occasionally—we have conference calls. Haphazardly. If there is a 
reason to have one. I would say we have maybe two per year. We do 
meet at the annual partners meeting. And we communicate 
somewhat more frequently by e-mail, for instance, if there is a new 
policy being considered or some decision to take on a matter which 
has ethical implications. [I1]  
Moreover, some of the weaknesses that participants attribute to 
“specialists” or “committees” actually stem from insufficient investment by the 
firm. Relying solely on one specialist creates potential problems of coverage, in 
addition to being a burden to the specialist if the firm does not compensate in-
house service. Relying solely on a committee without incentives for individual 
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ineffective. However, both sets of problems can be avoided by increased 
investment in the same structural form. For instance, a firm could have multiple 
compensated specialists or pay individual partners to serve as the permanent chairs 
of committees.  
In the end, then, a firm’s preference for specialists versus committees 
appears to be secondary to the issue of overall firm investment. Firms vary 
enormously in size, structure and management culture, such that no one structure 
will work for every firm. Our sample includes a variety of workable structural 
models based on a variety of combinations of specialists, committees and 
voluntary leadership. The key, we think, is for firms to be mindful of the potential 
weaknesses of different structural arrangements, and to invest sufficient resources 
in the compliance function.  
2. Full-Time Versus Practicing Specialists 
We now turn to the relative benefits of full-time versus practicing 
specialists. We already have alluded to some advantages of full-time specialists. 
Full-time specialists tend to define their in-house responsibilities broadly and to 
take a proactive role in promoting ethics and regulatory compliance. The full-time 
specialists in our sample provide such important services as systems monitoring, 
training, and the development of print and electronic resources. One full-time 
specialist from a firm of only 100 lawyers reports that she has plenty of work, even 
without any outside practice.  
Full-time specialists also may be more approachable than practicing 
specialists. One full-time specialist told us that she thought that partners were more 
likely to consult her than to consult a practicing partner, because they were less 
afraid of imposing on her time or appearing to be ignorant: 
I think partners felt a comfort level about asking questions at an 
earlier stage than they would of the partners on the PR committee. 
They didn’t have to worry about taking up my time, that I otherwise 
would be practicing; they didn’t have to worry about seeming dumb. 
They felt I was in a less judgmental mode. [I2] 
 This kind of approachability may be especially important to associates, 
who may feel safer consulting a full-time specialist than a partner who evaluates 
their work. The participant just quoted reported that her position was created 
specifically for this purpose: 
When I took this job, the PR committee was working fine. The 
concept originally was that my part would be primarily with 
associates—that associates might feel more comfortable—I am not a 
partner; my title is “special counsel.” So we thought associates 
might feel more comfortable coming to me with questions. [I2] 
As will be discuss in Part IV, participants stressed that approachability is 
critical to their effectiveness. Most of the compensated specialists in our sample 
said that the biggest challenge of their position is getting people to come forward 
with issues. Yet while full-time specialists may be more approachable than 
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could maintain credibility with practicing partners. As one participant put it, 
“They’re not down in the trenches and that’s what some lawyers are always talking 
about: “I’m in the trenches and you’re not.” So I think there is some benefit to . . . 
having an active practice. [C2]” 
An active practice may be especially important for conflicts specialists, 
because practitioners presumably are sympathetic to the disappointment of losing 
potential business. As one conflicts specialist explained:  
I think that the reason that the counseling is done by individuals 
who really are functioning, practicing lawyers—I’m a litigation 
partner, I have a litigation practice—is that we feel that people who 
are actively engaged in practice can bring experience to bear that’s 
important to take into consideration in resolving many of these 
issues. I also think that decisions, or the advice we give—I have no 
idea how much I cost the firm in the course of a year by telling them 
we can’t take on matters—I think the judgment is accepted more 
readily because it is coming from somebody who is an active 
partner in the firm. [B2] 
Further, while most of the full-time specialists in our sample “grew up” 
practicing in their firms, and thus came into their positions with practice 
credibility, practicing specialists predicted that this credibility would wear off over 
time: 
I think that you could have someone doing this full-time who has 
been close to the practice for most of her or his career, but I think if 
that person got into the position and then was in it too long 
exclusively, without being in touch with the practice . . . not 
working on a practice level with other lawyers . . . that the person 
does become somewhat isolated and in an ivory tower, if you will . . 
. . [C2] 
As a result, some practitioners questioned whether anyone in their firm 
would be attracted to a full-time, in-house job. As one practicing specialist 
remarked:  
We don’t have a full-time person. The question is, where would we 
find one? How would we get that person to do [it] when they 
probably would flourish better in their own practice? And 
alternatively, do we want to bring someone in from the outside? . . . 
It takes fifteen years to be able to, you know, [build credibility] . . . . 
But it would be great if we could figure out a way to move from our 
model . . . to a different model that would work. [A5] 
And a full-time specialist agreed: 
I think all of us . . . see an advantage in having experience in the 
firm . . . But at some point you have got to have people who want to 
do this or it doesn’t work. And there are going to be a number of 
firms who don’t have that . . . . [A13] 
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One thing all participants agreed on was that the in-house specialist should not be 
an academic. As one participant explained: 
There are certainly times when bringing an academic in would be 
the appropriate thing to do but kind of on isolated stuff, particular 
issues. [In other contexts] they could be too easily blown off. 
Basically someone—ivory tower, pie in the sky, no practical 
[experience]. [C1] 
At which point an academic chimed in, “What could be worse than that? 
[Laughter].” 
Despite their differing opinions on the benefits of an outside practice, 
participants agreed that the most important source of credibility for both full-time 
and practicing specialists is the visible support of firm leaders. One participant 
reported: 
One of the things we talked about last night at our table was, one 
thing we could agree on is that none of this stuff works unless you 
have the power of the firm behind you. Whether or not you have 
individual power or how you get things done, whether it’s because 
you are a big rainmaker or have a pleasing personality, you need 
[top management support]. [A13] 
Compensation, of course, is one way to signal management support. One 
full-time specialist in our sample, in negotiating the terms of her position, 
emphasized that she wanted a salary that would signal the firm’s respect for the 
job: 
I said I don’t care about the money, the dollars, but I need a salary 
that indicates the respect of the law firm for the position. And I want 
the salary to remain in appropriate proportion [to the value of the 
position to the firm]. And that was important to me. Of course, no 
one knows my salary. But management knows it. [I2] 
In another firm that we know of, full-time specialists’ salaries are tied to 
the value of partnership shares.
51 
Participants also emphasized the importance of the example set by 
powerful partners. For instance, the full-time specialist just quoted returned to her 
firm, after a fifteen-year absence, to a full-time, in-house position. Despite the fact 
that she does not practice and is not a partner—not to mention that she came from 
academia—she reported that she commands significant respect in her firm, thanks 
to the visible support of firm leaders:  
When I first came, the associates weren’t sure who I was and how I 
was viewed by the firm. So the associates didn’t come to me. But 
the partners came immediately. Once the partners came to me, it 
permitted the associates to come to me . . . I am constantly consulted 
by the top people. The chairman of our firm—he is not the 
managing partner—he is more important. He is the biggest 
                                                                                                                  
  51.  Personal communication with the managing partner of a 1,000-plus lawyer 
firm. 2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  583 
 
rainmaker, has the highest salary—he consults me constantly, and 
he sends his people to me. I save this law firm money by keeping 
them out of trouble. I do see other administrative positions, even at 
this law firm, that are not respected in the same way. [I2] 
Thus, as in the comparison between specialists and committees, structural 
arrangements are only one aspect of firms’ investment in regulatory compliance. 
Other aspects that are less measurable—leadership, culture—are no less important. 
We now turn to the personal and professional characteristics of in-house 
compliance specialists.  
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF IN-HOUSE COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS 
Most previous research on the role of in-house compliance specialists 
comes from the equal employment opportunity (EEO) or employee rights context, 
where there is a conflict of interest between employers and employees. This 
research finds that in-house specialists tend to identify with management interests 
and to side with employers at the expense of employee-grievants.
52 Thus, previous 
studies tend to emphasize the role of in-house compliance specialists in diluting, 
rather than promoting, regulatory goals.
53 
For instance, studies show that human resource and personnel 
professionals played a significant role in promoting the development of formal 
EEO policies and grievance procedures within organizations;
54 but that, in 
practice, internal procedures tend to undermine EEO rights, by recasting EEO 
claims as interpersonal problems and discouraging confrontation of potentially 
unlawful conduct.
55 Studies in the sexual harassment context, in particular, have 
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been critical of internal grievance procedures for legitimating the very conduct that 
the law is designed to prevent.
56  
These studies sound an important cautionary note for those, like us, who 
are interested in promoting the development of compliance procedures within law 
firms. Internal compliance procedures—and the specialists who manage them—
potentially could serve primarily to legitimate unethical or unlawful conduct and to 
forestall more effective external regulation.  
We are mindful of these studies and the cautions that they raise. However, 
two factors distinguish the regulatory context that we are addressing from the 
regulatory context addressed in most previous research. First, most professional 
regulation does not pit law firm partners against associates or other employees. 
Thus, unlike the EEO context, internal conflicts about regulatory goals and the 
standards for “compliance” will not necessarily split along hierarchical lines. On 
the contrary, since most firms’ compliance efforts focus on managing conflicts of 
interest, most internal regulatory conflicts are likely to be between partners.  
Second, unlike human resource and personnel specialists, whose 
professional identity does not depend on legal expertise or a normative 
commitment to the goals of EEO law, in-house compliance specialists in the law 
firm context are distinguished precisely by their substantive expertise and their 
personal commitment to the goals of professional regulation. As noted above, 
nearly half of the specialists in our sample are volunteers who are not compensated 
directly for their in-house service. Furthermore, as we discuss in this section, most 
specialists in our sample express a strong normative commitment to ethics and 
regulatory compliance, and have a long record of related professional service.  
Granted, we selected participants based on their reputations as in-house 
specialists; thus, our sample probably represents a group of particularly committed 
specialists. In addition, because our analysis relies on self-reports, we are not in a 
position to evaluate the accuracy of participants’ accounts. Nevertheless, it appears 
to us that the alternative to a committed specialist is no specialist at all, rather than 
a specialist whose primary function is to legitimate noncompliance. We suggest, 
therefore, that the primary issue (at least at this stage of firms’ structural 
development) is firms’ investment in in-house compliance specialists, rather than 
specialists’ commitment to the goals of professional regulation.  
This section examines the nascent development of in-house compliance 
specialists as a professional group. We first examine the personal and professional 
characteristics of  participants in our study, and their expressed commitment to 
their in-house role(s). We then discuss the main challenges that participants face 
and their strategies for promoting ethics and regulatory compliance in their firms. 
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Finally, we examine the emergence of professional networks among specialists, 
and speculate about future bases for professional organization.  
A. Personal and Professional Characteristics 
All but one of the specialists in our sample is a partner or in a position of 
comparable seniority, such as “of counsel” or “special counsel.” Over two-thirds 
of participants for whom we have law school graduation dates (nineteen out of 
twenty-five) graduated in the 1950s (n=4), 1960s (n=5), or 1970s (n=10). Most 
participants—like most partners—are men (twenty-seven out of thirty-two), and all 
are white. 
Most participants practiced in their firms for many years before becoming 
involved in in-house compliance efforts, with litigation being the most common 
practice specialty. All but one participant (the associate) report significant 
litigation experience, and the associate, a recent law graduate, is a member of her 
firm’s business litigation group. Besides litigation, the most common practice 
specialties reported by participants are ethics and professional liability, insurance, 
banking, and bankruptcy. 
Most participants expressed a strong commitment to promoting high 
ethical standards in their firms and the profession as a whole. Several characterized 
their in-house service as a “labor of love.” According to one uncompensated 
specialist, “It’s something of a personal commitment that keeps my door open, 
effectively, for people to come to my office.” [C2] 
Most participants (twenty-three out of thirty-two) have a long record of 
service in bar associations, with an emphasis on committees dealing with ethics 
and professional responsibility issues, such as judicial ethics, pro bono, legal aid, 
and professional discipline. Many participants (n=10) also report service on bar 
and government committees dealing with civil rights. About one-third of 
participants (n=12) have law teaching experience, most as adjunct faculty of 
professional responsibility, and several continue to serve as adjuncts.  
As a group, participants gave the impression of being meticulous, rule-
oriented, and extremely cautious about exposing their firms to liability. One 
participant attributed her caution to her background as a litigator: 
There are differences in the way litigators and corporate lawyers 
approach professional responsibility issues. I always look at 
everything I write, including internal e-mail, as potential evidence in 
a case. A litigator has a worst-case scenario attitude, whereas the 
corporate lawyers think it will all work out. They think, “We’re all 
so cooperative.” [I2] 
In some cases, caution was evident even in participants’ manner of 
speech. When asked why he was approached to serve as in-house counsel in his 
firm, one participant gave the following response: 
I don’t really know. I can’t really answer that. The person who had 
been doing it before thought I would be appropriate. I can’t say 
why. I could speculate, if I were forced. Maybe because I am very 
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Participants’ caution and commitment to protecting their firms’ interests 
also were evident in their responses to our questions about possible research 
strategies. In each focus group, we spent one session asking participants for 
suggestions about how we might measure the “effectiveness” of internal 
compliance procedures. We asked specifically whether we could get access to 
information about the effectiveness of procedures in their firms. This question was 
met uniformly with laughter, followed by a polite response along the lines of “not 
in a million years.” As one participant responded: 
I wouldn’t let you do it . . . . I’ll be damned if I am going to let those 
kinds of records outside . . . . And every firm that’s around this 
table, the person who’d be asked whether you can come in would be 
the person who’s sitting right here. [A10] 
On the whole, then, the specialists in our sample seemed experienced, committed, 
cautious, and intent on protecting their firms’ reputations and interests. Many 
spoke in terms of keeping their firms “out of trouble,” by which they meant 
insuring compliance with professional regulation. Thus, like in-house compliance 
specialists in the EEO context, the specialists in our sample clearly identified with 
“management” interests. In this context, however, loyalty to management appears 
to further regulatory goals. 
B. Challenges of In-House Practice  
Participants stressed two related challenges in their in-house practices: 
first, that they feel overburdened as an internal resource; and second, that there is 
no way to insure that people come forward with questions and problems. We 
already have discussed the burden on uncompensated participants, who field 
questions throughout the day while trying to conduct their own full-time practice. 
Consider the following comments by volunteer specialists: 
Every day it’s a constant flow of questions . . . They don’t usually 
take more than ten or fifteen minutes each, but sometimes there’s 
research that has to be done. [C3] 
I answer the phone all the time. There’s constant interruption . . . . 
The pace of one’s practice is much different when you’ve got 150 
clients right there in the building who feel absolutely free to come in 
at any time, and who simply think they are the only ones and there 
aren’t 149 others that are doing the same thing they are . . . . [C2] 
However, compensated specialists, too, report that they face significant time 
pressure in their in-house roles. Like all clients, in-house clients want their answers 
fast: 
The one thing that I think is common at all of our firms is that the 
people we work with don’t like to wait for answers. They like to 
have . . . their calls returned quickly. [B4] 
People call me at home, and everything is an emergency. I was 
going to wall paper my office with those little yellow message slips, 
all of them say “it’s an emergency, please call me within the next 
five minutes.” I could work twenty-four hours a day . . . . [I2] 2002]  ETHICS COMPLIANCE SPECIALISTS  587 
 
Despite this complaint, participants worry that some questions never 
come to their attention. According to participants, the thing that keeps them “up at 
night” is how to get people, especially partners,
57 to raise rather than ignore ethical 
questions. As one participant said: 
I’m never sure whether any of the major conflict issues or ethical 
issues are brought to my attention. There’s a great variation among 
members of the firm in terms of who I deal with . . . I find that I 
spend a lot of time with some partners and virtually no time with 
others and it can’t be that the ones I don’t spend any time with don’t 
have any ethical problems. [A9] 
Some participants fear that their partners do not even recognize ethical questions.  
What worries me is that I know from [my] experience of working 
with a lot of lawyers in a lot of different settings that there is a 
tremendous amount of ignorance about ethics . . . . And what 
worries me is that it is very haphazard as to who comes for 
assistance and who doesn’t, and I don’t spend the time on the 
systems the way other people do and I think that is something that is 
a very useful function . . . . I think that there are special types of 
problems that we’re not getting a handle on and may not be able to 
get a handle on . . . . I worry about laterals who come in with 
substantial practices and what’s happening with those folks . . . and 
about some of the biggest cowboys in the firm . . . who don’t come 
frequently for assistance. [A6] 
Thus, as one participant put it, “Ninety percent of the problem is getting people to 
spot the issues and pick up the phone and call you.” [A4] 
C. Strategies for Promoting Compliance 
Participants reported a variety of strategies for increasing ethical 
awareness and making themselves available—and approachable—within their 
firms. In part, they stressed, it is a matter of personality and fit:  
How do you get people to come forward with issues so they may be 
resolved in the most appropriate way? . . . That’s the personality 
component of this particular job. If you have the right person 
operating in the right environment, you draw people to you and it 
becomes part of the culture. [A12] 
Several participants emphasized the importance of being 
“nonjudgmental.” One participant described his attitude as “there but for the grace 
of God go I.” Participants also emphasized the importance of not saying “no” 
directly, especially on intake questions. The following comments are illustrative: 
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I think one has to be somewhat nonjudgmental . . . [so that] others 
find it easy to approach you and to deal with the serious problems. 
[C2]  
To be most effective, you have to go through a process of 
convincing your colleagues that “I’m not saying no, I’m just telling 
you all these things because eventually you are going to say no, and 
we are going to get where we want” . . . . Standing up in front of a 
group and saying “thou shalt not”—it tends not to work very 
effectively when you have 600 owners of a firm and each one 
believes he or she is autonomous. [A7] 
If you say no all the time, people will go underground. And if they 
think that you give them correct advice—that you are on their side, 
you would like to do what you can to facilitate the acceptance of the 
matter but you know where the lines need to be drawn—they’ll 
come to you. [A5] 
In addition to making themselves approachable, compensated participants 
stressed the importance of proactive strategies, such as going door-to-door. One 
full-time specialist told us, towards the end of a focus group: 
[After the focus group] I’ll be getting on the train, to go to [a 
different city], and tomorrow at lunch I will talk to all the new 
attorneys who joined our [] office since last year, so they have a face 
they can attach with a phone number in [the city in which the main 
office is located] and say, “here’s what I do, here’s what resources I 
have that are available to you, here’s some rule provisions that 
might come up sooner rather than later, here’s some firm policies to 
be aware of.” That’s Thursday lunch. Friday lunch is talking to all 
the attorneys in the [] office on recent cases and ethics opinions in 
[that jurisdiction]. I think getting out there, and being there, brings 
people to me. [B4] 
Another full-time specialist reported a similar door-to-door strategy: 
I spend at least two days a month in each of our other offices. And 
when I’m in [our main office], I’m constantly just walking around 
the floors. I’ve knocked on doors rather than have people come to 
see me . . . . I have the luxury of time to be able to do that. [A11] 
Compensated specialists also stressed the importance of regular in-house 
training, and other educational efforts such as e-mails and newsletters alerting firm 
members to regulatory developments. One full-time specialist runs a year-long, 
mandatory training series for new litigation associates. As she said: 
It’s a competence issue. For instance, with our new litigation 
associate training we go through all aspects of it—case 
management, research, handling new cases, jurisdiction issues and 
fact investigations, pleadings, complaints and answers, ethics . . . . 
And there is no CLE credit. [I2] 
Finally, several participants suggested tying in-house compliance efforts 
to lawyer compensation, either formally or by implication. For instance, one full-
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the ear of the firm’s executive committee, and that he has, on occasion, reported 
uncooperative partners:  
I can sometimes have an impact on someone’s compensation 
because there are some people who are cooperative and some people 
who are not so cooperative . . . . And generally speaking, anybody, 
for example, who hasn’t been very cooperative on conflicts issues is 
probably not cooperative on a bunch of other things around the firm. 
[A11] 
Another example of using compensation as an incentive comes from a 
full-time specialist in a 200-lawyer firm, who bragged that her firm gets 100% 
attendance at its annual ethics program: 
We hold our annual ethics [program] . . . on the night before final 
decisions are made in the Executive Committee for both percentages 
for the partners and compensation for associates, and that would be 
announced along with the mandatory nature of the program, and 
then the sign-up sheet was right there. And the second year [we did 
it this way], we got 100%. [A12]  
Again, then, participants’ comments illustrate the importance of direct investment 
in in-house compliance efforts. Firms that provide economic incentives and visible 
management support, not surprisingly, are perceived by participants to be more 
effective in promoting compliance than firms that do not. We now turn to the 
emergence of professional networks among specialists. 
D. Emergence of Professional Networks  
Much of the influence of personnel specialists in the EEO context 
stemmed from their external organization as a professional group.
58 Not only does 
external organization bolster individuals’ authority within firms, but professional 
networks are critical for spreading information and ideas between firms.
59 One 
reason that we are interested in the emergence of in-house compliance specialists 
is because of their potential to organize around this practice specialty. An active 
specialist group could play a leading role in defining industry standards for law 
firm self-regulation. 
Currently, there is no formal association of in-house compliance 
specialists, which is not surprising at this early stage of professional development. 
Even in our “snowball” sample, which relied on professional networks to identify 
participants,
60 some participants report that they rarely interact with other in-house 
specialists.  
                                                                                                                  
  58.  See Edelman, Legal Environments, supra note 11, at 1434 (discussing the 
influence of personnel professionals); Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, 
supra note 12, at 412–25 (reviewing articles in management and personnel journals touting 
the benefits of internal grievance procedures).  
  59.  See Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments, supra note 12, at 498–501 
(reviewing research on the role of professional networks in spreading particular compliance 
strategies among organizations).  
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Many participants do, however, interact with their firm’s liability insurer; 
and some insurers organize periodic meetings of firm representatives. ALAS, for 
instance, holds an annual educational conference for its members and attendance is 
viewed as a perk. As one participant noted, “If you are the ALAS coordinator, you 
get a free trip to someplace like Bermuda.” [B5] 
ALAS also provides ongoing loss prevention counseling to its insureds, a 
practice that reportedly is catching on among other insurers (such as Lloyds).
61 
Several participants credit ALAS for shaping the development of in-house 
compliance efforts in their firms; and we heard similar comments about the role of 
other insurers, “We got a lot of help from ALAS, loss prevention and ethics help.” 
[A7] 
In [my city] there are a dozen or so large law firms and all but one 
of them is insured by [name of insurer] and there are periodic 
meetings of the loss prevention counsel . . . . And certainly with 
every one of those law firms . . . there’s someone who everyone 
readily identifies as the person you go to with loss prevention issues 
for sure, but also, I think, with ethics issues. And at all of those 
firms, I know the people . . . who do that sort of thing. . . .  [A14] 
These comments suggest that insurers are likely to play a central role in 
the development of professional networks among in-house compliance networks, 
as well as in the definition of industry standards for compliance.
62 Professional 
associations that focus on ethics and liability issues, such as the Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL),
63 also may be important arenas for 
promoting exchange. 
Ultimately, however, in-house compliance specialists face a unique set of 
issues and challenges due to their structural position(s) within firms, and many 
participants in our sample are eager for professional guidance. Consider the 
following list of questions from a full-time general counsel:  
Somebody comes in and reports to you; do you document or do you 
not? I mean, do you use e-mail? I hate e-mail. I don’t want anything 
on the system . . . . Do you give—do you have a little sign that says 
                                                                                                                  
  61.  Personal communication with in-house compliance specialists at two large 
law firms insured by Lloyds. 
  62.  For a discussion of the role of insurers as regulators of law practice, see 
Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996) (arguing that “the bar has proved itself to be supremely 
self-serving in regulating itself” and welcoming the role of insurers); Charles Silver, 
Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to 
Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233 (1996) (discussing the ways in which liability insurers also 
act self-interestedly). 
  63.  Founded in 1990, APRL is “an independent national organization of lawyers 
concentrating in the fields of professional responsibility and legal ethics, including: law 
professors; bar association counsel; counsel for respondents in disciplinary hearings; ethics 
expert witnesses; legal malpractice litigators; counsel to disciplinary committees; and in-
house law firm ethics counsel.” See ASS'N OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY LAWYERS, MISSION 
STATEMENT, at http://www.aprl.net (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). Several participants in our 
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I’m the firm’s lawyer, not yours? . . . If I get a sexual harassment 
complaint . . . what role am I doing? I think there are a lot of 
questions . . . . I talked to [people at APRL] about . . . [my in-house] 
role, what do I do? And the answer was, “we’re very glad you’ve 
joined [the association], we don’t have any idea.” [A13]  
Thus, to the extent that in-house compliance specialists become 
institutionalized in large law firms, we expect to see the emergence of a new 
association—or perhaps new initiatives by APRL or the American Corporate 
Counsel Association (ACCA)
64—to represent in-house specialists’ interests as a 
professional group. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis is based on a small, non-random sample and is necessarily 
exploratory. Because we selected participants based on their reputations as in-
house specialists, we suspect that they represent a set of particularly compliance-
oriented firms. Further, most of the firms in our sample are headquartered in the 
Northeast, whereas some important geographic areas, such as California, are not 
represented at all.  
Nevertheless, we think our analysis raises a host of interesting questions 
for more systematic research. First, how prevalent are in-house compliance 
specialists in law firms, controlling for size? When were most positions created? 
What are the fastest growing titles? Are there significant regional variations? To 
answer these basic descriptive questions would require a national random sample 
of firms; however, as we have noted, even the most systematic survey of formal 
positions and titles would reveal relatively little about specialists’ functional roles.  
Second, how specialized are in-house compliance “specialists,” in terms 
of the percentage of time that they devote to the in-house role? We deliberately 
defined the role of “in-house compliance specialist” broadly, including some 
people who spend less than 300–500 hours per year on in-house work. Yet our 
sample also includes full-time specialists and practicing specialists who spend 
1,500 hours per year on the in-house function. Does it make sense to group all 
these lawyers together, as if they represent some kind of developmental 
continuum?  
Third, what, if anything, does this range of investment tell us about firms’ 
functional needs? Our analysis suggests that size is an important, but not 
determining, factor in the level of firm investment in the compliance function. 
Based on participants’ comments and rough controls for size, it appears to us that 
some firms invest significantly more than others, and that the level of direct 
                                                                                                                  
  64.  Founded in 1982, ACCA has over 13,000 members representing over 6,000 
corporations in the US and abroad. See A M. CORPORATE  COUNSEL  ASS'N, ABOUT 
ACCA/GCCA,  at http://www.acca.com/about/index.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). 
Membership, however, is limited to “attorneys who practice law as employees of 
organizations and who do not hold themselves out to the public for the practice of law.” See 
AM. CORPORATE  COUNSEL  ASS'N, BECOME A MEMBER,  at http://www.acca.com/ 
MemberCentral/becomemember (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). Thus, in-house compliance 
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investment reflects firms’ values as much as their needs. To test this idea 
systematically, however, would require a broader sample of firms and more 
accurate measures of firms’ (versus specialists’) overall investment .  
Finally, how do firms’ investments in the in-house “compliance” function 
compare to their investments in other management functions? Are firms with full-
time managing partners more likely to also have general counsel or other full-time 
managers devoted to ethics and regulatory compliance? Do firms committed to 
management-by-committee spend less time managing, or is it simply a matter of 
centralized versus decentralized management? Are there certain regulatory issues 
(such as conflicts) that demand a centralized approach? Our impression is that 
management-by-committee tends to result in lower overall investment in the 
compliance function, and that such firms are increasingly vulnerable to gaps in 
professional self-regulation. Again, however, we can only speculate given the 
exploratory nature of our study. 
In addition to these empirical questions, the emergence of in-house 
compliance specialists raises a host of regulatory questions that our analysis does 
not begin to address. Like corporate counsel, in-house counsel in law firms face 
special professional challenges in balancing their duties to the firm, its members, 
its clients, and the public. Moreover, in-house counsel in law firms face additional 
challenges as a result of the law firm setting and the emergent nature of their role. 
Given the increasing importance of in-house compliance efforts, and the increasing 
scrutiny of such efforts by federal regulators, we hope that researchers and legal 
ethics scholars will invest in addressing these questions.  